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[BMW of North America v. Gore1], I would not join the Court’s 
swift conversion of those guides into instructions that begin to 
resemble marching orders.” 
—Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg2 
 
“We therefore rely primarily on state courts to fulfill the 
constitutional role as primary guarantors of federal rights.  But the 
state courts must do more than recite the constitutional rule.  They 
also must apply it, faithful to its letter and cognizant of the principles 
underlying it.  Unfortunately, such review is not always 
forthcoming.” 
—Justice Sandra Day O’Connor3 
 
“Is it up to a state court to sit in judgment about whether our remand 
orders are in error or not?”  
—Justice Antonin Scalia4 
 
“Is there any way for us to ensure against, in effect, a bad-faith 
response [by lower courts] to our decisions?” 
—Justice David H. Souter5 
 
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, which evoked exasperation from 
Justices Scalia and Souter at its oral arguments, appeared before the U.S. 
Supreme Court three times in the past decade.6  The only question under 
                                                      
 1. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 2. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 3. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 490 (1993) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 4. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 46, Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 556 U.S. 178 
(2009) (No. 07-1216) [hereinafter Williams III Transcript] (emphasis added) (question of Justice 
Scalia to State of Oregon advocate, Robert S. Peck). 
 5. Id. at 48. (commenting, while mulling over his concern, that the Oregon court’s 
persistence in sustaining the punitive damage award given in the earlier Williams II decision may 
send a signal encouraging disobedience by other lower courts). 
 6. In Williams I, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and remanded the case back to the 
Oregon courts to consider the possible effects of Campbell, which was decided after the Oregon 
Court of Appeals had reached its final decision.  Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams (Williams I), 
540 U.S. 801 (2003) (mem.).  In Williams II, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a 
challenged jury instruction that was approved by the Oregon Supreme Court.  Philip Morris USA 
Inc. v. Williams (Williams II), 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007).  The jury instruction at issue appeared 
to Justice Breyer, writing for a five-to-four majority, to cross the due process line first drawn by 
the Court in Gore.  Id. at 352 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 547).  The Gore decision considered actual 
and potential harm caused by the defendant’s wrongful acts to persons other than the plaintiff.  Id. 
at 353. 
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consideration in Williams III was the Oregon Supreme Court’s handling of the 
remand in Williams II—to correct the constitutionality of a jury instruction 
regarding the calculation of a punitive damages award.7  In its decision on 
remand, the Oregon Supreme Court did not implement Justice Stephen 
Breyer’s seemingly clear directions.8  Instead of correcting the constitutional 
error identified, the Oregon Supreme Court reaffirmed the original punitive 
damages judgment against Philip Morris on a procedural ground not previously 
considered during the appellate review of the case.9  Commenting to the Court 
about this surprising development during the December 2008 oral arguments, 
Stephen Shapiro, Philip Morris’s attorney, asserted: 
We are here today because the Oregon court failed to follow this 
Court’s direction on remand and because the ground it gave is not 
adequate to show a forfeiture of due process rights . . . .  This Court 
vacated [Williams II] after finding that the Oregon Supreme Court 
applied the wrong constitutional standard, and it remanded with 
directions to apply the standard that the Court laid out.  But the 
Oregon court didn’t do that.  It never even addressed the 
constitutional issue.10 
Four months later, in a curious and unexplained move, the Court summarily 
dismissed Williams III without taking further action, stating only that 
“certiorari [had been] improvidently granted.”11 
This was not the first time in recent years that the Supreme Court faced 
resistance or reluctance by a state supreme court on a remand to fully 
implement the Court’s directions to correct punitive damages awards that were 
determined to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or excessive.  This resistance is 
                                                      
 7. Williams II, 549 U.S. at 350–51.  As read by Justice Breyer and the majority, the 
questionable instruction in Williams II could be reasonably interpreted by a jury to allow the jury 
to consider actual and potential harm caused by the defendant’s wrongful acts to persons other 
than the plaintiff when calculating the size of the punitive damages award necessary to fully 
punish the defendant and deter future wrongdoing.  Id. at 354.  Justice Breyer stated that he 
thought the Court had clearly ruled in Gore that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
prohibits a state from imposing punishment for harm inflicted upon strangers to the litigation, 
thereby rendering constitutionally defective the jury instruction that appeared to permit such 
punishment.  Id. at 352–53. 
 8. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc. 176 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Or. 2008), vacated and remanded 
by Williams I, 540 U.S. 801 (2003). 
 9. Id.  The Oregon court ruled that the jury instruction requested by Philip Morris at the 
original trial so badly misstated Oregon law that, under well-settled Oregon precedent, Philip 
Morris was barred from appealing the plaintiff’s instruction that was actually given to the jury 
and which formed the basis for the Supreme Court review sought by Philip Morris in Williams II.  
Id. at 1263–64. 
 10. Williams III Transcript, supra note 4, at 3. 
 11. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams (Williams III), 556 U.S. 178 (2009) (per curiam); 
see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Withdraws in Tobacco Case, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at 
B2. 
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also evident in the aftermath of both BMW of North America v. Gore12 and 
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automotive Insurance Co.,13 two leading cases 
on punitive damages decided before Williams II.  In these two cases, the Court 
most fully developed the framework for applying the “fair notice” principle, 
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, to review 
punitive damages awards.14 
Of the nine punitive damages cases the Court has decided in the past  
twenty-five years, only Gore and Campbell were vacated because the Supreme 
Court found the state courts’ decisions in violation of evolving substantive due 
process jurisprudence as applied directly to the size of punitive damages 
awards.15  In both cases, on remand, the state supreme courts only partially 
complied with the Court’s orders and also failed to fully apply the Court’s 
suggested analysis.16  In Gore, on remand, the Alabama Supreme Court 
ignored the suggestion that punitive damages awards over four times the 
compensatory damages were excessive.17  Although the Alabama Supreme 
Court did reduce the punitive damages award, it did so to a figure twelve and 
one-half times the compensatory award.18  The defendant, BMW, did not seek 
further judicial review of the reduced award.19 
                                                      
 12. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507 (Ala. 1997).  Gore was the first case in 
which the Court applied its substantive due process analysis to hold a state punitive damage 
award excessive ($4 million punitive damages for $4000 compensatory damages).  BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 509 (1996).  On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced 
its original punitive damages award from $4 million to $50,000.  Gore, 701 So. 2d at 515.  By 
setting the corrected punitive award at over twelve times the compensatory damages, however, 
the Alabama Supreme Court failed to follow the Supreme Court’s recommendation that punitive 
damages should not exceed a single digit ratio in relation to the compensatory damages, with a 
preference for four-to-one ratios.  Gore, 517 U.S. at 581.  No further review of the Alabama 
decision was sought by the defendant.  Id. 
 13. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409 (Utah 2004).  In Campbell, the 
Court remanded to the Utah Supreme Court a $145 million punitive damages award it determined 
to be flawed on several counts, and almost certainly unconstitutionally excessive.  State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 415 (2003).  On remand, the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed each of the issues identified in the Supreme Court’s opinion as problematic and 
reaffirmed its earlier decision with respect to the correctness of its rulings under Utah law.  
Campbell, 98 P.3d at 412.  The Utah court reduced the size of the punitive damages award from 
$145 million to just over $9 million.  Id. at 410.  This adjusted punitive award was still nine times 
the compensatory damages awarded in the case, notwithstanding the view expressed by the 
Supreme Court that any punitive damages award larger than a one-to-one ratio might be excessive 
on the facts of the case.  Id. at 410–12.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court denied certiorari when 
review was sought a second time by the defendant.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
543 U.S. 874 (2004). 
 14. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417–18; Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–86. 
 15. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429; Gore, 517 U.S. at 585–86. 
 16. Gore, 701 So. 2d at 515; Campbell, 98 P.3d at 410–12. 
 17. Gore, 701 So. 2d at 515. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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In Campbell, Justice Anthony Kennedy rejected a punitive damages award 
of $145 million as grossly excessive, stating that the proper punitive damages 
award should be near the $1 million in compensatory damages  
awarded—a one-to-one ratio.20  On remand, the Utah Supreme Court rejected 
State Farm’s argument that the Supreme Court “mandate[ed]” a punitive 
damages award no higher than the compensatory damages and only reduced 
the award to $9 million.21  This award had a nine-to-one ratio between the 
punitive and compensatory damages and thus was the greatest possible ratio 
within the Court’s preferred single-digit ratio framework.22  The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari when State Farm sought further review.23 
This history provides a context for the concern that the lower courts might 
be misapplying or failing to apply Supreme Court precedent governing 
punitive damages.  This concern was highlighted during the Williams III oral 
argument, when Chief Justice John Roberts suggested that, if there was 
something “malodorous” about how Oregon handled the remand in Williams 
II, perhaps articulating a clear standard regarding the proper ratio might help 
ease this concern and “protect [the Court’s] constitutional authority” in 
excessive punitive damages claims.24  The Justices, particularly Chief Justice 
Roberts, seem concerned that the Oregon court’s rejection of their analysis in 
Williams II, on remand, may be symptomatic of other courts ignoring or 
misapplying Supreme Court precedent governing punitive damages.25 
The Court’s continued reluctance to establish a clear, bright-line rule for 
determining excessiveness in punitive damages awards draws attention to the 
question: Why did the Court grant certiorari in Williams II to review only the 
technical correctness of the jury instruction about possible punitive damages, 
when the relationship between the punitive damages award and the 
compensatory damages was ninety seven-to-one, far larger than what the Court 
                                                      
 20. Campbell, 438 U.S. at 425. 
 21. Campbell, 98 P.3d at  413. 
 22. Id. 
 23. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 543 U.S. 874 (2004). 
 24. Williams III Transcript, supra note 4, at 51–52; see also id. at 55 (statement of Justice 
Berger, acknowledging that Chief Justice Roberts did, in fact, suggest “that maybe [the Court] 
should reach the issue of due process on the amount?”). 
 25. See id. at 52–55.  Professor Catherine M. Sharkey has discussed the problems of state 
recognition of Supreme Court precedent by noting the dissonance between the Court’s recent due 
process jurisprudence as applied to punitive damages awards, and its repeated recognition that, as 
a matter of policy, questions regarding when such damages are permissible are primarily matters 
for the states.  Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive Damages 
in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 449–50 (2010).  
Professor Sharkey’s article outlined several strategies that state courts or state legislatures could 
follow if they wished to exert greater resistance to the Supreme Court’s federalization of these 
issues.  Id. at 464–77. 
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previously suggested to be constitutionally permissible?26  One possible 
explanation is that the Supreme Court assumed that overturning the decision on 
                                                      
 26. Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 351 (2007).  There is rich scholarly literature discussing the 
Supreme Court’s recent applications of due process principles to limit punitive damages awards.  
For an example of the discussion before 2004, see Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on 
Punitive Damages: Why State Farm Won’t Be the Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779, 779–87 
(2004).  Since 2004, scholarly intrigue and discussion has grown continuously.  See, e.g., Michael 
P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1 (2004) (explaining the wide range of methods and reasoning that have been used by the Court to 
invalidate awards of punitive damages and the potential for confusion they present); Melissa 
Michelle Davis, Procedural Protections in Punitive Damage Cases: Ensuring that Juries Are 
Asking the Right Questions About Wealth Evidence, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1119, 1120–27 (2008) 
(emphasizing the importance of jury instructions and how due process may be satisfied even in 
the cases of high punitive damages as long as proper procedures are maintained and followed to 
assure consistent and fair results); Thomas H. Dupree, Jr., Punitive Damages and the 
Constitution, 70 LA. L. REV. 421, 422–24 (2010) (describing the uncertainty that surrounds 
punitive damages due to unclear and conflicting jurisprudence); Anthony J. Franze, Clinging to 
Federalism: How Reluctance to Amend State-Based Punitive Damages Procedures Impedes Due 
Process, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 297, 299–302 (2008) (describing the discrepancies between 
states’ jury instructions and the Court’s guidance on constitutional limits on punitive damages and 
the need to improve the jury instructions); F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on 
Punitive Damages Awards: “Morals Without Technique?”, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 350–54, 356 
(2008) (citing inconsistencies in punitive damages jurisprudence as complicating their use and the 
problems that arise from awarding punitive damages based on harm to a third party); Jenny Miao 
Jiang, Whimsical Punishment: The Vice of Federal Intervention, Constitutionalization, and 
Substantive Due Process in Punitive Damages Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 793, 796–98, 828–29 
(2006) (describing how the Court found that punitive damages fall under the Due Process Clause 
and arguing that the Court should focus on guaranteeing procedural due process rather than 
invalidating specific amounts of punitive damages as being too excessive); Alexandra B. Klass, 
Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 95, 141–43 (2007) (arguing that the 
Court’s restriction of punitive damages to single-digit ratios may inhibit a court’s ability to 
account for unvalued harm that has occurred); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of 
Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 251, 327–29 (2009) 
(detailing a framework for the implementation of punitive damages based on the Court’s past 
rulings); Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in State Farm, 
56 BUFF. L. REV. 1035, 1042 (2008) (arguing that high punitive damages awards will cause 
businesses to account for the risk of them being imposed through raising prices and other 
methods, which could have detrimental effects for the company); Doug Rendleman, A Plea to 
Reject the United States Supreme Court’s Due-Process Review of Punitive Damages, in THE LAW 
OF REMEDIES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE COMMON LAW 540–41 (Jeff Berryman & Rick Bigwood 
eds., 2010) (describing the differing opinions between the Justices as to what “grossly excessive” 
means); Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Road Not Taken: Would Application of the Excessive Fines 
Clause to Punitive Damages Have Made a Difference?, 17 WIDENER L.J. 949, 959–60 (2008) 
(arguing that the State’s punitive damages framework should assure that juries do not seek to 
punish a defendant for harm done to strangers); Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From 
Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 959, 973 (2007) (describing the Court’s efforts to assure 
that punitive damages are not excessive, but also to assure that they are not awarded in an 
arbitrary manner that could threaten the established tort system); Sharkey, supra note 25, at  
449–51 (describing issues that have arisen out of the Court’s holdings in punitive damages cases); 
A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal Excessiveness 
Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1123–24 (2006) (arguing that the Court’s use of due 
process to invalidate punitive damages awards improperly expands the Due Process Clause); 
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the basis of a faulty jury instruction would require a new trial, which would 
yield a new punitive damages award and make it unnecessary to review the 
original award for excessiveness.27  Chief Justice Roberts, however, 
characterized the limited grant of certiorari as an indication of the Court 
pointedly avoiding the excessiveness issue,28 which heightened scholarly 
curiosity regarding the Court’s seeming indifference toward an arguably 
                                                                                                                             
Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 73, 92–97 (2007) (describing the Court’s use of procedural and substantive due 
process to invalidate excessive punitive damages claims); James M. Underwood, Road to 
Nowhere or Jurisprudential U-Turn?  The Intersection of Punitive Damages Class Actions and 
the Due Process Clause, 66 WASH & LEE L. REV. 763, 763–68 (2009) (describing the Court’s 
initial reluctance to prohibit punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm to third parties); 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 
1758–59 (2012) (describing the tensions between the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of 
Oregon in deciding the issue of constitutional limits on punitive damages); Michael I. Krauss, 
Response: “Retributive Damages” and the Death of Private Ordering, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 167, 168 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/02–2010/Krauss.pdf 
(describing the issues that have arisen from punitive damages jurisprudence); Dan Marke, Reply, 
Punitive Damages and Private Ordering Fetishism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 283, 284 
(2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/05-2010/Markel.pdf (describing punitive damages 
frameworks that states may adopt to meet constitutional requirements); David G. Owen, 
Response, Aggravating Punitive Damages, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 181, 182 (2010), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/02-2010/Owen.pdf (describing the issues that arise for 
litigants in cases that involve punitive damages due to the uncertainty punitive damage litigation 
has caused). 
 27. This strategy was already employed by the Court in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., in which a procedural irregularity required remand and rendered it 
unnecessary to rule on the excessiveness claim based on a ninety-to-one ratio between punitive 
damages and compensatory damages.  532 U.S. 424, 441 (2001). 
 28. Williams III Transcript, supra note 4, at 51–51.  The Oregon court awarded $821,000 in 
compensatory and $79.5 million in punitive damages.  Williams v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 127 
P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006).  In its earlier punitive damages cases, the Supreme Court articulated 
the constitutional limits that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes on the 
size of punitive damages awards.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 
(2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568–70 (1996).  In Gore and Campbell, the 
Court promulgated the three guideposts for lower courts to apply in reviewing potentially 
excessive punitive damages awards and to justify punitive damages: (1) the defendant’s conduct 
must be “reprehensible;” (2) the ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages must 
be reasonable; and (3) where relevant, the civil fine or criminal penalty for comparable conduct 
should be used as a benchmark.  Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–75.  The 
second guidepost concerning the ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages has 
received the most attention by the Court.  See Michael P. Allen, Of Remedies, Juries, and State 
Regulation of Punitive Damages: The Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 343, 349 (2008).  In Exxon, although due process jurisprudence was discussed 
favorably, it was not entirely useful in determining the acceptable size of the punitive damages 
award, which was reduced from $2 billion to $500 million—achieving a one-to-one ratio.  Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 481, 513–15 (2008). 
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excessive award and its reluctance to apply its new due process 
jurisprudence.29 
Compounding the puzzle was the Court’s summary dismissal of Williams III 
several months after oral arguments, stating that certiorari had been 
“improvidently granted” as the only explanation.30  One potential explanation 
for the summary dismissal is that the Supreme Court recognized that, rather 
than exhibiting an unwillingness to follow precedent, the Oregon court was 
merely exercising its authority in supervising its own procedural domain and 
would provide a proper jury instruction henceforth.  Later Oregon cases are 
consistent with this explanation and appear to demonstrate subsequent 
compliance with Supreme Court precedent.31  If this “no harm, no foul” 
explanation is correct, once the Court decided not to send the jury instruction 
back to the Oregon court again, why did it not extend its original grant of 
certiorari to include the excessiveness issue?  Perhaps the Justices preferred 
waiting for a case with less egregious facts to fine-tune Guidepost 2. 
Another possible explanation of the summary dismissal advanced by one 
scholar is that it signaled the Supreme Court’s retreat from its close oversight 
of state punitive damages awards.32  This interpretation of Williams III appears 
difficult to sustain, however, in light of the Court’s response to the punitive 
damages issue in Exxon Shipping Co. v Baker, a high-profile 2008  
multi-billion dollar admiralty case arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 
                                                      
 29. Williams II evoked a significant amount of scholarly writing addressing the procedural 
and evidentiary questions raised.  See generally Symposium Edition, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1 
(2008) (containing nine articles addressing punitive damages).  See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, 
Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive 
Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 407–08 (2008) (speculating that when the Williams Court claimed 
it was relying on procedural due process, it it was serious because the argument for substantive 
due process was untenable); Davis, supra note 26 (reasoning that the outcome of Williams may 
have been the result of the Supreme Court’s interest in cleaning up procedural improprieties 
rather than refining its excessiveness review); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, 
Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The Prejudicial Practice of a “Reverse Bifurcation” 
Approach to Punitive Damages, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 375, 398–401 (2008); Sharkey, supra 
note 25, at 461–62, 464 (suggesting that Williams demonstrates the limitations of the Supreme 
Court’s authority and capacity within the state law realm of punitive damages but also perhaps the 
empowerment of state court defiance). 
 30. Williams III, 556 U.S. 178, 179 (2009) (per curiam); see also Sharkey, supra note 25, at 
450 n.3 (noting that the Supreme Court does not usually provide reasons for dismissal). 
 31. See Joseph J. Solberg & Karen A. Hosack, Punitive Damages After Philip Morris USA 
v. Williams: Has the Smoke Cleared? 18 J. L. BUS. & ETHICS 73, 74, 87–89 (2012) (noting that 
the Oregon Court of Appeals reined in jury-awarded punitive damages with ratios in excess of the 
Supreme Court’s guidance, but the Oregon Supreme Court reinstated the arguably excessive 
award in Hamlin (citing Hamlin v. Hampton Lumber Mills, Inc., 246 P.3d 1121 (2011); Goddard 
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 179 P.3d 645, 670 (2008))). 
 32. See generally Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts out of 
Punitive Damages for Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525 (2011). 
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Alaska.33  In Exxon, despite favorably discussing its recent due process 
jurisprudence, the Court recognized the availability of punitive damages in 
admiralty cases and articulated a new federal norm of a presumptive  
one-to-one ratio between punitive and compensatory damages.34 
Considering the concerns expressed by the Justices regarding whether state 
courts are failing to follow the Supreme Court’s punitive damages directions, 
the question arises: Is recalcitrance to implement Supreme Court guidance an 
aberration among lower courts or is it relatively commonplace?  Based on an 
extensive study of over five hundred reported cases reviewing punitive 
damages awards published since Campbell in 2003, this Article concludes that 
lower courts’ “faithfulness” to their constitutional obligations in accepting and 
applying the three Gore/Campbell guideposts35 is not cause for concern. 
This Article focuses primarily on the issue of lower courts’ faithfulness to 
the Supreme Court’s directions as to how constitutional review of punitive 
damages awards should be conducted.  Part I briefly traces the history of the 
Supreme Court’s “federalization”36 of punitive damages law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause through the establishment of 
three constitutional guideposts for lower courts to follow.  Part II explores how 
these guideposts should work by applying them to a hypothetical case against 
oil industry defendants involved in the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe.  Part 
III then considers whether there is a conventional legal understanding of lower 
courts’ obligations when they hear cases on remand.  Part IV outlines the 
methodology employed to identify, classify, and analyze the punitive damages 
cases decided by lower courts since the Campbell decision.  This Article 
reports the results of a detailed examination of cases involving punitive 
damages claims decided since 2003, looking for evidence of whether lower 
courts are ignoring, resisting, or even chaffing under the new constitutional 
guideposts they are expected to follow.  Finally, Part V asserts that lower 
courts are obediently following the Supreme Court’s “marching orders”37 
through their own interpretations and applications of the relevant guideposts.  
In short, the concerns raised in Williams III about the faithfulness of lower 
                                                      
 33. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476, 515 (2008); see also Joni Hersch  
& W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages by Numbers: Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 18 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 259, 259–60 (2010). 
 34. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 480–81 (noting that the Ninth Circuit reduced the 
plaintiff’s punitive damages award from $4 billion to $2.5 billion); see also In re the Exxon 
Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by and reh’g en banc denied, 490 F.3d 1066 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 35. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996). 
 36. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalism, 53 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1353, 1420 (2006). 
 37. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (providing that the term “marching orders” was first used somewhat disparagingly by 
Justice Ginsburg). 
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courts to the Supreme Court’s emerging punitive damages jurisprudence are 
not justified by how those courts are actually deciding punitive damages cases. 
I.  EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW GOVERNING CHALLENGES TO PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES AWARDS FOR ARBITRARINESS OR EXCESSIVENESS 
Although based on remedial considerations different from those that animate 
most of Anglo-American tort law, punitive damages, in some form, have been 
a part of the United States’ common law heritage for centuries.  The English 
origins of punitive damages law have been well documented by judges and 
scholars.38  Initially, some U.S. jurisdictions did not recognize claims for 
punitive damages when first encountered, but in the 1854 case of Day v. 
Woodworth, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a plaintiff’s entitlement to 
a jury award for punitive damages to punish unusually aggravated wrongdoing 
by a defendant was “well established” in American common law.39  
Throughout the next century, most U.S. courts allowed juries wide discretion 
in determining whether punitive damages were justified and in fixing the 
amount of the punitive damages award necessary to punish the defendant and 
deter future bad conduct.  During this period, judicial review of jury awards of 
punitive damages was highly deferential.  Awards were set aside only if they 
were clearly the product of “prejudice, passion, or bias” on the part of the jury, 
or if the award “lacked evidentiary support or . . . shocked the . . . conscience” 
of the reviewing court.40 
                                                      
 38. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES 522 (4th ed. 1868) (demonstrating 
that English cases in the eighteenth century that awarded private plaintiffs money beyond what 
they could prove as compensatory damages denoted these extra damages as “exemplary”).  These 
early cases often involved private actions against governmental actors who had exceeded their 
authority.  See J. G. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF DAMAGES 758 (1883).  As the recognition of the 
possible availability of punitive damages migrated to America, the typical early case involved a 
different type of abuse of power, namely outrageous social or economic conduct deliberately 
intended to harm and humiliate the plaintiff.  Id. at 726.  A few state courts refused to recognize 
the availability of a claim for exemplary damages, the legitimacy of which was subject to 
vigorous debate among tort scholars.  See, e.g., Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 125–26 (Colo. 1884); 
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1873).  The availability of punitive damages in the proper case 
appeared increasingly well settled by the middle of the nineteenth century.  See also Barry v. 
Edmonds, 116 U.S. 550, 563 (1886) (noting the virtually unfettered discretion of juries to award 
punitive damages).  During this time period, American punitive damages cases most often 
involved railroads and other common carriers, whose employees egregiously harmed customers.  
See Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 522–23 (1885).  In the early twentieth century, 
the reach of punitive damages awards was extended to egregiously fraudulent conduct in business 
dealings and other personal wrongs reflecting particularly reprehensible conduct by the 
defendant.  See 1 DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.11(10) n.5 (2d ed. 1993). 
 39. 54 U.S. (12 How.) 363, 371 (1854) (stating that a plaintiff’s entitlement to punitive 
damages for unusually aggravated conduct by a defendant was “well established” in American 
law). 
 40. James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damage Awards—An Expended Judicial Role, 72 MARQ. L. 
REV. 33, 35–36 (1988). 
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This began to change in the latter half of the twentieth century.  Beginning in 
the 1960s, a few lower federal court opinions expressed serious concerns about 
the undisciplined nature and exploding size of punitive damages awards.41  In 
the 1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court, while continuing to rule that 
punitive damages awards generally were not subject to constitutional scrutiny 
by federal courts, nevertheless held that punitive damages’ unpredictability 
rendered them inappropriate in cases in which First Amendment rights were at 
issue,42 and in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against city officials.43  In a 
seminal 1982 article,44 Professor Dorsey Ellis observed that the incidence of 
large punitive damages awards was rising rapidly and questioned whether such 
awards were the best way for society to regulate egregious misbehavior by 
tortfeasors.45  Because of the escalating rate of punitive damages awards, Ellis 
also raised doubts that would-be tortfeasors were afforded fair notice of the 
severe consequences of losing a lawsuit alleging their misbehavior.46  Later in 
the 1980s, several legal scholars began building arguments to constrain or 
eliminate punitive damages as a remedy.47 
A.  Early Supreme Court Discourse: Addressing State Courts’ Punitive 
Damages Awards Practice 
The first hint that the Supreme Court might be open to considering 
constitutional challenges to punitive damages awards appeared in a 1986 
decision in which the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was used 
to challenge an Alabama Supreme Court Justice’s refusal to recuse himself 
when he stood to obtain a financial gain depending on the outcome of the 
case.48  In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, the plaintiffs raised other 
                                                      
 41. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839–41 (2d. Cir. 1967); 
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702, 737 (5th Cir. 1965) (Rives, J., dissenting). 
 42. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50, 367 (1974). 
 43. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259–60 (1981). 
 44. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
 45. Id. at 2, 53. 
 46. Ellis focused his concern on two different issues. First, he challenged the economic 
efficiency of private law enforcement through punitive damages.  Id. at 31.  Second, he raised a 
fairness issue: given the extreme unpredictability of punitive damages awards, can wrongdoers be 
fairly said to be on notice about the possible drastic financial consequences of their harmful 
actions?  Id. at 22.  On this latter point, Ellis anticipated, by almost a decade, the start of the 
Supreme Court giving attention to the “fair notice” element of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and its procedural and substantive implications regarding the need to rein in 
punitive damages awards challenged as arbitrary or excessive.  Id. at 53. 
 47. See John Calvin Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 
VA. L. REV. 139, 140 (1986); see also David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages 
Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 CHI. L. REV. 1, 59–60 (1982); James B. Sales  
& Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic that Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. 
REV. 1117, 1157 (1984). 
 48. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 375 U.S. 813, 815 (1986). 
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constitutional challenges to the amount of punitive damages awarded in 
addition to the recusal for bias claim.49  The Court declined to address both the 
defendant’s Eighth Amendment excessive fine claim and the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process claim; however, Chief Justice Warren Berger 
expressly stated that both raised “important issues which, in an appropriate 
setting, must be resolved.”50 
It did not take long for the appropriate setting to arise.  Although several 
justices played key roles over the next two decades in expanding the scope of 
the Due Process Clause to encompass problematic punitive damages awards, 
Justice O’Connor was the most relentless champion of the enterprise.51  When 
Justice O’Connor retired from the U.S. Supreme Court in 2005, she left a 
lasting mark on constitutional law in several important fields.  In describing 
her legacy, however, few scholars highlighted her successful campaign to 
subject punitive damages awards to searching constitutional scrutiny, both 
procedurally and substantively.  Thanks to Justice O’Connor, the Supreme 
Court ultimately developed a new and controversial set of constitutional 
standards applying the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to 
evaluate possible unreasonableness or excessiveness of punitive damages 
awards.52 
                                                      
 49. Id. at 828. 
 50. Id. at 828–29. 
 51. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87–89 (1988) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (flagging, for future consideration, the idea that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment might impose constitutional limits on the unreasonableness or 
excessiveness of punitive damages awards).  Justice O’Connor was persistent about applying 
constitutional standards to punitive damages awards.  One year later, in another dissent in 
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., Justice O’Connor emphasized 
Professor Ellis’s assessment of the burgeoning problem by asserting that punitive damages 
awards were “skyrocketing” and that the threat of enormous punitive awards acted as a damper on 
the research and development of new products.  492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting in part).  Justice O’Connor argued unsuccessfully that the “excessive fines” provision 
of the Eighth Amendment should operate through the Fourteenth Amendment to impose a 
substantive ceiling on state punitive damages awards.  Id. at 300.  Justice O’Connor also renewed 
her call for applying procedural due process to the seemingly unregulated discretion granted to 
juries under the traditional common law process for determining both the appropriateness and size 
of punitive damages awards.  Id. at 283.  She justified her position by asserting that inherent in 
the concept of due process was the proposition that defendants were entitled to fair notice with 
respect to the probable consequences of their wrongdoing, and that because punitive damages 
were a form of civil penalty, the idea that the punishment should fit the wrong was applicable.  Id. 
at 297.  In discussing these issues, Justice O’Connor foreshadowed, by seven years, the eventual 
adoption by the Court of formal constitutional guideposts to assist lower courts in their review of 
jury awards of punitive damages.  Id. at 300–01. 
 52. Justice O’Connor’s ideas about due process imposing outside limits on punitive 
damages were first officially embraced by the Court in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).  The majority opinion expressly endorsed the application of both 
procedural and substantive due process to jury awards of punitive damages, but nevertheless 
found that the traditional common law process used in Alabama met procedural due process 
standards because it was subjected to careful review by both the trial judge and the appellate 
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In the view of some constitutional scholars, the Court completely 
“federalized” the common law governing punitive damages in a series of 
decisions in which it invoked the principle of “fair notice,” found embedded in 
the Due Process Clause.53  Applying procedural due process principles, the 
Court first required all states to provide meaningful opportunities for rigorous 
judicial review of punitive damages.54  The Court later extended this reasoning 
by requiring de novo review of the reasonableness of punitive damages 
awards.55  In a 2007 ruling, oddly characterized as procedural, the Court 
required that jury instructions confine the jury’s deliberations to the plaintiff 
alone and not to strangers to the litigation when considering the appropriate 
punitive damages size.56  This new application of procedural due process 
principles to punitive damages is uncontroversial, except for several opponents 
who claim that it intrudes too greatly into the legitimate interests of the states 
to shape their laws and processes.57  Justice O’Connor’s campaign to impose 
both procedural and substantive constitutional limits on punitive damages 
continued in her dissent two years later in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance 
Resources Corp.58 
                                                                                                                             
court.  Id. at 19–24.  The majority also found that the punitive damages award, which was over 
four times the compensatory damages award, was not unconstitutionally excessive.  Id. at 23.  
Justice O’Connor’s dissent was lengthy and strongly worded.  Id. at 42–54 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (remarking that the award was “close to the line” but did not lack objective criteria).  
O’Connor noted that excessive punitive damages awards “have a devastating potential for harm.”  
Id. at 42.  She characterized the traditional common law deference to jury decision-making as so 
unprincipled as to be unconstitutionally “void for vagueness.”  Id. at 43.  Justice O’Connor also 
renewed her insistence that the Court should set forth constitutional “guideposts” to assist lower 
courts in their decision-making regarding whether to award punitive damages and the appropriate 
size of awards.  Id. at 57. 
 53. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 36, at 1420. 
 54. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20–22. 
 55. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001). 
 56. Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 353–55 (2007). 
 57. Id. at 364 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should “accord more 
respectful treatment to the proceedings and dispositions of state courts that sought diligently to 
adhere to [the Court’s] changing, less than crystalline precedent”); see also, e.g., Franze, supra 
note 26, at 302; Sharkey, supra note 25, at 477–78. 
 58. 509 U.S. 443, 480 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  The TXO majority agreed that due 
process standards based on fair notice applied to both the process by which punitive damages 
were awarded and the size of the award made.  Id. at 458 (majority opinion).  The plurality 
opinion, however, found that the traditional jury process was satisfactory under procedural due 
process norms and also held that the award, which was 526 times the size of the compensatory 
award, was not unconstitutionally excessive because the defendant’s wrong raised the potential 
for great harm to the plaintiff.  Id. at 460–62.  Although Justice O’Connor agreed with the 
majority’s principle, she condemned the traditional common law deference to the jury as 
standardless and argued that the award at issue was grossly excessive because there was no 
evidence in the record supporting the potential harm analysis.  Id. at 484–86 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
One year later, in Honda Motor Co. LTD. v. Oberg, the Supreme Court finally applied the 
procedural due process analysis long advocated by Justice O’Connor to strike down an Oregon 
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B.  The Three Guideposts: Due Process and Punitive Damages 
Despite repeated dissents, the Supreme Court ultimately extended the due 
process principle of fair notice to the size of punitive damages awards.59  This 
extension of substantive due process is based on the argument that even the 
most egregious tortfeasors should not be unfairly surprised by the size of 
punitive damages awards.60  Since 1996, the Court has utilized this fair notice 
analysis with respect to both deservedness and the possible excessiveness of 
awards.61  To guide lower courts in implementing the newly imposed 
constitutional responsibility to review punitive damages awards, the Court 
established three guideposts in Gore62 and further refined them in Campbell.63  
Justice Kennedy recited the three guideposts as follows: “(1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual 
                                                                                                                             
court’s punitive damages decision on the basis that Oregon law prevented state courts from 
conducting a meaningful review of jury punitive damages awards.  512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994).  
Justice O’Connor joined Justice Stevens’s majority opinion and did not write separately.  Id. at 
416–17.  The concept of a constitutionally mandated meaningful review of punitive damages 
awards was expanded in a later case also involving Oregon’s law.  See Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 
U.S. at 436.  In this case, the Court remanded a punitive damages award ninety times the 
compensatory award because of a procedural defect—a lack of de novo review of the jury award 
by an appellate court.  Id.  The Court did not reach the excessiveness issue because the necessity 
of de novo review meant that the award was not final.  Id. at 435.  Justice O’Connor again joined 
the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens and did not write separately.  Id. at 425. 
 59. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996). 
 60. Id.  In 1996, the Court struck down an Alabama court’s award of punitive damages on 
the grounds that the size of the award was unconstitutionally excessive as a matter of substantive 
due process.  Id. at 585–86.  In Gore, the punitive damages award to the plaintiff was 500 times 
the compensatory damages, but the defendant’s misconduct was far from egregious and inflicted 
only minor economic harm.  Id. at 574–75.  The Supreme Court also found fault with the 
Alabama trial process, which allowed the jury to consider the defendant’s legal business practices 
in other states with alleged out-of-state victims who were not parties to the litigation in Alabama.  
Id. at 572–73; see also Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2007) (holding a similar procedural 
fault as the basis of remand to the Oregon courts after the jury appeared to consider harm done to 
non-plaintiff parties in determining the size of the appropriate punitive damages award).  Justice 
O’Connor joined the majority opinion in Gore and also Justice Breyer’s concurrence, arguing that 
the Alabama jury process was subject to other more serious deficiencies overlooked by the 
majority.  Gore, 517 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that “[t]he standards the 
Alabama courts applied here are vague and open ended to the point where they risk arbitrary 
results”).  For the first time, the Court accepted Justice O’Connor’s plea to provide greater 
instruction to lower courts by adopting three guideposts for reviewing punitive damages decisions 
challenged as unconstitutionally unreasonable or excessive.  Id. at 574–75.  The guideposts, 
however, were not concrete rules to be strictly applied, but were rather general principles for the 
lower courts to adapt to the facts of individual cases.  Id. at 585–86.  Dissenters on the Court and 
tort scholars scoffed at the guideposts as an unprincipled incursion into the legitimate realm of 
state decision-making that lower courts would find very difficult to implement.  See, e.g., id. at 
605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere” and provide no 
real guidance). 
 61. Dupree, supra note 26, at 421. 
 62. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–83. 
 63. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418–28 (2003). 
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or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and 
(3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the 
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”64  The guideposts 
aim to assure, through “[e]xacting appellate review[,] . . . that an award of 
punitive damages is based upon an ‘application of law, rather than a 
decisionmaker’s caprice.’”65 
Williams II did not involve interpretation or application of the guideposts.66  
The holding was narrow and explicitly deemed procedural by Justice Breyer, 
thus reinforcing the principle that a jury may not constitutionally take into 
account harm to strangers to the litigation when calculating punitive damages 
awards.67  This holding drew a fine line, however, because the Supreme Court 
concedes that the defendant’s misconduct, which harms others within the state, 
may be taken into account by the jury when considering awarding punitive 
damages based on the defendant’s degree of reprehensibility.68 
C.  Punitive Damages and the Unconstitutionally Excessive Standard 
The court’s decision in Exxon regarding excessive punitive damages is 
difficult to reconcile with the rest of its due process analysis.69  Exercising 
original jurisdiction over admiralty law cases, the Supreme Court surprised tort 
lawyers and scholars by upholding the Ninth Circuit’s four-to-four decision to 
allow punitive damages.70  The Court created new federal admiralty 
jurisprudence on punitive damages excessiveness by upholding—but 
                                                      
 64. Id. at 418.  Seven years after Gore, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Campbell, 
which involved a punitive damages award of $145 million.  Id. at 412.  Expectations were raised 
that the Court would elaborate and refine the guideposts to provide greater direction to lower 
courts.  The decision in Campbell did not fulfill these expectations to any substantial degree.  See 
Lauren R. Goldman & Nickolai G. Levin, State Farm at Three: Lower Courts’ Application of the 
Ratio Guidepost, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 509, 549 (2006) (noting that “many courts . . . resist fully 
implementing State Farm’s guidance” while others have “virtually ignored” the decision).  The  
six-to-three decision, in which Justice O’Connor joined the majority, vacated the Utah court’s 
decision and remanded it for reconsideration, but stated that the case was easy to decide in favor 
of the defendant by applying the guideposts because the punitive damages award was so grossly 
excessive.  Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429.  Thus, the decision did not provide an extended analysis of 
how the guideposts clarified that the Utah court’s decision was unconstitutional.  The majority 
opinion minimally expanded the reprehensibility factor, the ratio norms, and how substantial 
variance from these norms would appear.  Id. at 419–28.  The Court also said little about the 
comparability to sanctions for similar offenses, other than observing that criminal punishments 
were of limited relevance.  Id. at 428.  As elaborated in the Campbell opinion, the three 
guideposts set forth in Gore are intended to be operative tests for constitutional review of punitive 
damages awards challenged as arbitrary or excessive.  Id. at 422. 
 65. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
 66. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 67. Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2007). 
 68. Id. at 357. 
 69. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 70. Id. at 475–76, 486. 
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lowering—the original award by eighty percent.71  Justice Souter, writing for 
the majority, approvingly described the evolution of the Court’s due process 
tests, emphasizing the second guidepost—ratio—but declining to apply such 
analysis in Exxon.72  Justice Souter instead chose to develop new federal 
admiralty standards limiting the size of punitive damages when large 
compensatory damages have already been awarded.73  In applying these new 
principles to Exxon, Justice Souter lowered the punitive damages award to a 
one-to-one ratio, suggesting that this should be the norm in all cases with very 
large compensatory damage awards.74 
Justice O’Connor’s drive for increasingly aggressive Supreme Court review 
of state punitive damages awards has never commanded decisive majorities in 
cases in which her views prevailed;75 the Court is almost always closely 
divided on these issues.76  Justice Scalia has strenuously resisted using the Due 
Process Clause to prescribe the size of state court punitive damages awards 
since first broaching the issue in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.77  
Justice Clarence Thomas later joined Justice Scalia in his position.78  Their 
repeated objections rest on the ground that elected legislatures, not the 
judiciary, should establish new due process protections.79  The historical 
argument is that the common law processes for jury determination of punitive 
damages were already well established before the Fourteenth Amendment was 
enacted in 1868.80  Thus, the dissenters argue that constitutionally limiting 
punitive damages with the Due Process Clause would be an impermissible 
                                                      
 71. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 33, at 259–61. 
 72. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 501–02. 
 73. Id. at 512–15. 
 74. Id. at 513–15. 
 75. Robert J. Rhee, A Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages, 111 U. MICH. L. 
REV. 33, 46 (2012) (noting Justice O’Connor’s criticism of punitive damages,  
“advocat[ing] . . . strict constraints, and [crafting] forceful dissents in Browning-Ferris, Haslip, 
and TXO [that] may have influenced her colleagues and the Court’s later thinking”). 
 76. The landmark Gore decision was decided by a five-to-four margin.  BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 561 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408, 411 (2003) (six-to-three decision); Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 348 (2007) (five-to-four 
decision).  Although only tangentially related, Exxon Valdez was four-to-four.  Exxon, 554 U.S. at 
474. 
 77. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24–28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (arguing that the Due Process Clause cannot logically be applied to a common law 
practice that antedated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 78. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (disclosing Justice Thomas’s first instance of joining Justice Scalia disputing the 
proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment is a “secret repository” of all sorts of substantive 
rights). 
 79. See RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION 
166–67 (2006) (describing Justice Scalia’s belief that the elected branches of government should 
expand due process rights, not the judiciary). 
 80. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
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federal reform of what was considered an adequate judicial process prior to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s passage.81  In later cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Ginsburg joined Justices Scalia and Thomas as dissenters, albeit on 
different grounds,82 and Justice Stevens joined the dissent in Williams II.83  
Justices Ginsberg and Stevens consistently emphasize what they characterize 
as unjustified incursions into state prerogatives, which violate basic federalism 
principles.84 
Even in cases holding punitive damages awards unconstitutionally 
excessive, the Supreme Court was careful to observe that legitimate state 
interests exist to justify the imposition of punitive damages in proper cases to 
punish and deter egregious conduct on the part of defendants.85  Although the 
Court has repeatedly mentioned only the two traditional tort law justifications 
for punitive damages—retribution and deterrence86—tort scholars87 and some 
lower court judges have questioned whether punishment and deterrence 
exhaust the legitimate state interests behind the imposition of punitive 
damages.88  For example, Professor Dorsey Ellis, Jr. advanced seven legal 
reasons that might justify the imposition of punitive damages in a particular 
case,89 but confirmed that punishment and deterrence were the fundamental 
purposes.90  Judge Richard Posner, in a widely cited 2003 opinion known 
                                                      
 81. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Due 
Process Clause’s “function is negative, not affirmative, and it carries no mandate for particular 
measures of reform”). 
 82. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 83. Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 358 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court 
improperly limited the State’s power to punish civil litigants for harms caused to non-parties). 
 84. See, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. 598–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reiterating that an award of 
punitive damages at the “discretion of the jury, subject to some judicial review for 
‘reasonableness,’” in state court is sufficient due process because “there is no federal guarantee a 
damages award actually be reasonable”). 
 85. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (stating that 
“‘[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in 
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition’” (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 568)). 
 86. See id. 
 87. See, e.g., Christopher J. Robinette, Peace: A Public Purpose for Punitive Damages?, 2 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 327, 327 (2008) (dismissing the promotion of peace through punitive 
damages); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 945–46 (1998) (noting that punitive damages may encourage market 
transactions to avoid potential litigation). 
 88. See infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 89. Ellis, supra note 44, at 3.  Professor Ellis enumerated the seven grounds as the 
following: “(1) punishing the defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from repeating the offense; 
(3) deterring others from committing an offense; (4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing private 
law enforcement; (6) compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) paying 
the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.”  Id. 
 90. Id. at 11. 
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among tort scholars as the “bedbug case,”91 set forth a broader “law and 
economics” rationale for imposing punitive damages.92  Posner suggested that 
punitive damages may be necessary to provide a needed incentive to litigate 
when the harm done to multiple plaintiffs is too difficult to detect, too widely 
distributed, or compensatory damages are likely to be too small to justify any 
single plaintiff bringing an action.93  Judge Posner suggested that punitive 
damages awards may also help to prevent wealthy and determined tortfeasors 
from profiting from their ability to escape detection.94  The Supreme Court has 
not accepted any of these alternative rationales for punitive damages; instead, 
the Court has repeatedly emphasized the state’s interests in punishment and 
deterrence as the operative justifications.95 
II.  APPLYING THE THREE GUIDEPOSTS TO A HYPOTHETICAL SUIT AGAINST OIL 
INDUSTRY DEFENDANTS INVOLVED IN THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER 
The infamous April 2010 Deepwater Horizon catastrophe at the Macondo 
Well in the Gulf of Mexico96 presents a rich opportunity to illustrate how 
Gore’s three guideposts might be applied to an appellate court’s review of a 
jury’s large punitive damages award against British Petroleum (BP) or against 
one or more of the three other oil industry companies who contracted with BP 
for drilling the Macondo Well.97  The companies may be sued for the wrongful 
                                                      
 91. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, 347 F.3d. 672 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Colleen P. 
Murphy, The “Bedbug” Case and State Farm v. Campbell, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 579, 
581 (2004) (referring to the decision as the “Bedbug” case). 
 92. See Allen, supra note 28, at 366–67 (using the “Bedbug” decision as an example of “law 
and economics”). 
 93. Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Recognizing that the membership of the Supreme Court has changed substantially with 
the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the retirements of Justices O’Connor, Souter, 
and Stevens, the durability of these new constitutional limitations on punitive damage awards is 
questionable.  It is noteworthy that during their first three court terms together, Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito often voted in majority opinions in the few decisions in which the court 
favored business interests by overturning longstanding precedents for the newer punitive damages 
jurisprudence, including joining Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Williams II.  See Williams II, 
549 U.S. 346, 398 (2007).  Neither Justice Sonia Sotomayor nor Justice Elena Kagan have 
developed a judicial track record on their views about the application of due process standards to 
evaluate the excessiveness of punitive damages awards.  As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted in 
her Campbell dissent, this new interpretation of the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause rests “on ground not long held.”  State Farm Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408, 411 (2003).  The uncertainty about the newer Justices’ approaches to the crucial issue 
of unconstitutionally excessive ratios may also partially explain the abrupt dismissal of Williams 
III after it was argued. 
 96. Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Reconceptualizing the BP Oil Spill as Parens 
Patriae Products Liability, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 291, 294 (2012). 
 97. Such an award could also be against one of the other three oil industry companies most 
directly involved: Halliburton, Transocean, and Cameron International.  See id. at 299–300. 
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death of the eleven workers killed or for the environmental and economic harm 
caused by the devastating pollution of the Gulf.98 
A.  The First Guidepost: Reprehensibility of the Wrong 
Assuming the allegations are true and provable that BP, or other oil industry 
defendants with whom BP has “hold harmless” contracts, knowingly took 
unreasonable risks that endangered personnel on the drilling platform and 
caused the disastrous pollution of the Gulf,99 the first determination to be made 
with respect to punitive damages under the framework established in Gore 
would be the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.100  The 
Gore Court explained the reprehensibility factor as reflecting the well-settled 
notion “that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others.”101  The Court 
has stated that the degree of reprehensibility is “[p]erhaps the most important 
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.”102  Gore 
enumerated several factors for lower courts to consider in determining the 
degree of reprehensibility present in a particular case;103 the Court later 
clarified these factors in Campbell.104  The five factors, as enumerated in 
Campbell, are: (1) whether the conduct caused physical harm versus purely 
economic harm; (2) “indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or 
safety of others;” (3) the financial vulnerability of the plaintiff; (4) repeated 
instance of similar misconduct versus an isolated incident; and (5) whether 
“the harm result[ed] from intentional malice, trickery, or deceit” as opposed to 
a merely accidental happening.105  All five factors are rarely present in a single 
case, so the reviewing court must apply the factors that are relevant to the 
specific facts.  Although the presence of multiple reprehensibility factors 
makes sustaining the punitive damages award easier, one dominant factor can 
be sufficient to sustain an award.  In Campbell, however, Justice Kennedy 
opined that “the absence of all of [the five factors] renders any [punitive 
damages] award suspect.”106 
                                                      
 98. See, e.g., id. at 294 (noting that the action would be premised on a manufacturing or 
design defect); see also David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, 
Environmental Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1414 (2011). 
 99. See, e.g., Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 1419 (suggesting that the oil companies involved 
engaged in “risky behavior” and did not adequately focus on protecting the environment and the 
safety of their employees). 
 100. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996). 
 101. Id. at 575. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 576–77. 
 104. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing Gore, 517 
U.S. at 576–77). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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It is possible that the Deepwater Horizon incident could give rise to the rare 
case in which all five factors would apply.107  First, the oil companies’ conduct 
inflicted enormous physical harm through death and injury to humans and 
wildlife, likely causing long-term harm to regional ecosystems;108  their 
conduct also caused monumental economic harm to the Gulf region.109  
Second, defendants’ alleged relentless focus on speed and cost savings 
manifested an indifference to the safety of their workers, the environment, and 
the Gulf’s regional economy.110  Third, the fishing, seafood, and tourist 
industries in the Gulf region are particularly vulnerable to oil pollution.  
Fourth, BP’s safety record regarding its oil drilling, oil transport, and oil 
refining activities is checkered at best.111  Their record arguably reflects a 
pattern of placing profits above worker safety and environmental protection.112  
The Deepwater Horizon catastrophe was not an isolated incident.113  As to the 
fifth factor, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to prove deliberate deceit or 
outright malice in the planning and mismanagement of the Deepwater 
Horizon.114  Gross disregard for worker safety and severe damage to the 
environment because of reckless haste, however, are certainly in the same class 
of egregious conduct as the rapacious corporate practices condemned by the 
Court in TXO.115  Taken together, there is a strong case for the proposition that 
this catastrophe was not merely an innocent accident. 
B.  The Second Guidepost: Ratio of Punitive Damages to Compensatory 
Damages 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster also warrants application of the second 
Gore guidepost—the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.116  
The numerical relationship between the amount of compensatory damages and 
                                                      
 107. See id.; see also infra notes 108–15 and accompanying text. 
 108. Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 1414. 
 109. Id. at 1415–16. 
 110. See id. at 1416 (noting a common perception that the oil companies involved “put 
profits before safety”).  But see REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, NAT’L COMM. ON THE BP 
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL 
DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 125 (2011) (refusing to state explicitly 
whether the oil spill was the result of cutting corners to save money). 
 111. Rebecca M. Bratspies, A Regulatory Wake-Up Call: Lessons from BP’s Deepwater 
Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 7, 22–25 (2011). 
 112. Id. at 25. 
 113. Id. at 22–25. 
 114. See Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 1419 (noting that, although it is possible investigators 
could ultimately find evidence of deliberate criminal conduct, the oil companies involved are 
more likely to be held liable under a negligence standard). 
 115. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993) (sustaining a 
jury’s large punitive damages award in light of the offending company’s “malicious and 
fraudulent course [of action]”). 
 116. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996). 
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punitive damages is a significant consideration and is the most commonly cited 
basis for determining the excessiveness of a punitive damages award.117 The 
requirement of a reasonable relationship between punitive and compensatory 
damages was constitutionalized in Gore,118 but the exact definition of what is 
“reasonable” remains unsettled.119  The Court in Gore recognized the common 
law preference for single-digit ratios120 but refused to adopt a mathematical 
formula or other bright-line rule.121  The Court observed that consideration of 
the ratio is fact-specific; although a larger disparity between punitive and 
compensatory damages is subject to close scrutiny, the Court also recognized 
the possibility that certain factual situations could warrant higher punitive 
awards.122  The Court reaffirmed the fact-specific determination necessary to 
calculate the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in Campbell.123  Other 
pre-Gore decisions by the Court have stressed that the actual harm suffered by 
the plaintiff is not the sole factor in determining the acceptable ratio.124  
Several decisions have considered the relevance of other indices of 
reasonableness, including the extent of the potential harm that could have 
resulted.125  For example, had the Deepwater Horizon oil spill continued into 
hurricane season, the impact of a Category four or five hurricane, combined 
with millions of gallons of oil still pouring out of the uncapped well, could 
have resulted in a much higher amount of harm. 
                                                      
 117. Id. at 580–81. 
 118. Id. at 574 & n.22, 575, 580 (explaining that the Gore guidepost restrictions on the award 
of punitive damages is grounded in the principle of fair notice of penalty guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause). 
 119. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424 (2003) (qualifying its 
application of the second Gore guidepost to factually specific determinations by stating, “we have 
been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential 
harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award”); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 
U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (expressing reluctance to establish bright-line limits to define the 
reasonableness consideration). 
 120. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 (expressing approval for punitive damage ratios of ten-to-one 
or lower).  Indeed, in England, statutes allow double, treble, and occasionally quadruple damages 
awards to deter egregious wrongdoings.  Id. at 580–81. 
 121. Id. at 582–83. 
 122. Id. at 581–82. 
 123. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. 
 124. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (explaining 
that “both State Supreme Courts and [this] Court have eschewed an approach that concentrates 
entirely on the relationship between actual and punitive damages”). 
 125. See, e.g., Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007) (finding that it is “appropriate to 
consider the reasonableness of punitive damages awards in light of the potential harm the 
defendant’s conduct could have caused”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424–25 (referencing both actual 
and potential harm in considering limits on the ratio between compensatory and punitive 
damages); TXO, 509 U.S. at 460 (holding that “[i]t is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the 
potential harm that the defendant’s conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the 
wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible harm to the other victims that might have 
resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred”). 
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The amount of compensatory damages recovered by the plaintiffs injured by 
the Deepwater Horizon incident will undoubtedly be very high.126  In 
December 2012, BP pled guilty to federal criminal charges, including 
manslaughter, and agreed to pay $4.5 billion in fines.127  As of February 2013, 
BP had paid out $24 billion in clean-up costs and payments to damaged 
individuals, businesses, and local governments, reportedly setting aside an 
additional $42 billion to cover future legal obligations relating to the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster.128  The anticipation of a large compensatory 
damages award could result in the equal expectation, according to the Court’s 
decision in Campbell, of a limited punitive damages award.129  Indeed, 
punitive damages could be limited to the amount of the compensatory damages 
award, reflecting the one-to-one ratio established in Exxon.130  Conversely, the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster could be the paradigm of the extraordinary case 
that warrants higher punitive damages because of particularly egregious 
harm.131 Similarly, even in the event of high compensatory damages, the 
deterrent effect of punitive damages could justify a more disparate ratio, 
especially if the history of the defendant’s oil exploration activities reveals 
similar reckless conduct.132  The combination of a pattern of safety infractions 
and the wealth of a defendant like BP could impact the applicability and effect 
                                                      
 126. Press Release, British Petroleum, BP Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fund for 
Deepwater Horizon Spill and Outlines Dividend Decisions (June 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7062966; see also Ilisja 
Moreland, Comment, From the Exxon Valdez to the Deepwater Horizon: Will BP’s Dollar Reach 
Where the Oil Didn’t?, 14 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L.J. 117, 128 (2011) (recognizing the extent of 
BP’s potential liability). 
 127. Clifford Krauss, Battle Lines for the BP Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2013, at B8. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 (noting that “[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, 
then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of 
the due process guarantee”). 
 130. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513, 515 (2008) (establishing a one-to-one 
ratio in maritime cases).  It is possible that this ratio could apply to the Deepwater Horizon 
litigation, as a federal district court has determined that maritime law is applicable to the incident.  
See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951, 962–63 (E.D. 
La. 2011). 
 131. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (holding that the extent of 
harm caused to the plaintiff, whether actual or potential, warrants a higher ratio).  The idea of 
particularly egregious harm warranting a higher punitive damages award is reminiscent of the 
first Gore guidepost.  See id. at 575 (finding that “some wrongs are more blameworthy than 
others”). 
 132. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416; see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (explaining that 
punishment and deterrence are part of the underlying rationale of punitive damages); TXO Prod. 
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (recognizing the importance of imposing 
a proper punitive damages award in order to deter misconduct). 
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of deterrence in contemplating a larger punitive damages award.133  In 
weighing the guideposts, a court could reasonably approve a high damages 
ratio for the purpose of warning BP, and the entire oil industry, that higher 
standards of safety and environmental protection are expected in the future. 
C.  The Third Guidepost: Comparability to Civil Sanctions 
The third guidepost determines excessiveness of the punitive damages by 
contemplating the penalties of analogous civil actions or criminal violations.134  
It emphasizes the reasonableness of a punitive damages award when it is 
comparable to similar unlawful misconduct.135  Although this rationale was 
applicable in Gore, in which there was a sizeable disparity between the 
$10,000 statutory fine and the original $4 million in punitive damages awarded 
by the jury,136 subsequent cases have demonstrated that large differences 
between punitive awards and civil fines are not unusual.137  The state’s interest 
in punishing or deterring misconduct is not necessarily related to the policies 
underlying statutory penalties.138  In practice, it is often difficult to identify and 
interpret germane civil or criminal sanctions; increasingly, courts look to  
inter-and intra-jurisdictional precedent for comparability guidance.139  In the 
                                                      
 133. TXO, 509 U.S. at 463–64; see also Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Wealth and Punitive 
Damages, 17 WIDENER L.J. 927, 928–29 (2008) (advocating for the use of a party’s wealth in 
determining an appropriate punitive award). 
 134. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583. 
 135. See id. (explaining that “a reviewing court engaged in determining whether an award of 
punitive damages is excessive should ‘accord substantial deference to legislative judgments 
concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue’” (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of 
Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 136. Id. at 583–84. 
 137. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 410, 418 (Utah 
2004) (approving a $9 million punitive damages award even when the comparable statutory 
penalty was only $10,000). 
 138. Colleen P. Murphy, Comparison to Criminal Sanctions in the Constitutional Review of 
Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1443, 1460–61 (2004) (demonstrating how courts 
have struggled in translating criminal penalties in the form of imprisonment to an appropriate 
punitive award); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2002) 
(distinguishing punitive damages from comparable criminal sanctions by explaining that 
“[p]unitive damages are not a substitute for the criminal process, and the remote possibility of a 
criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive damages award”); Murphy, supra, at 
1450–51 (drawing a distinction between punitive damages and statutory penalties by explaining 
the different legislative purposes and intent underlying statutory sanctions).  The Court has 
recognized the policy interests of criminal penalties, distinguishable from that of civil sanctions, 
in other contexts as well.  See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99–100 (1997) 
(recognizing a wholly separate legislative intent between civil and criminal penalties in the 
context of double jeopardy). 
 139. See, e.g., Hamlin v. Hampton Lumber Mills, Inc., 246 P.2d 1121, 1130–31 (Or. 2011) 
(finding no real comparable sanction and concluding that “the third guidepost [did] not play a 
significant role”); Duncan v. Ford Motor Co., 682 S.E.2d 877, 891–92 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009) 
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case of Deepwater Horizon, a precedential approach could result in the 
application of Exxon and other cases involving the oil industry. 
The relative lack of utility of the third guidepost is reflected in the fact that 
comparable penalties are generally considered only after the application of the 
first two guideposts.140  Rather than simply drawing analogies between degree 
of misconduct and similar sanctions, cases applying the third guidepost 
struggle to interpret and apply penalties such as the disgorgement of profits, 
loss of a relevant business license, or possible incarceration.141  In Campbell, 
Justice Kennedy questioned the relevance of criminal sanctions, recognizing 
the challenge of applying the different presumptions and higher burdens of 
proof in criminal matters.142  If the third guidepost carried more weight, 
uncertainty about which civil or criminal sanctions should be used as 
comparisons might be of more concern; however, in many cases, the third 
guidepost appears to offer little or no meaningful direction to lower courts. 
Although the third guidepost is the least useful to reviewing courts in 
evaluating claims of excessiveness, it may justify higher punitive damages 
awards in the Deepwater Horizon calamity.  The federal criminal penalty for 
oil pollution is a steep fine ranging from $25,000 to $100,000 per day,143 plus 
full responsibility for all of the costs of cleaning up the spill.144  In this case, 
BP has already settled for $4.5 billion in federal criminal penalties.145  Other 
civil fines and costs are estimated to total tens of billions of dollars.146  It may 
                                                                                                                             
(recognizing a pattern of difficulty in finding and applying comparable civil or criminal penalties 
in South Carolina and upholding a punitive damages award based on the first two guideposts); 
Carlton Energy Grp., LLC v. Phillips, 369 S.W.3d 433, 460–61 (Tex. App. 2012) (finding no 
comparable penalties and basing the decision to sustain the punitive damages award on the first 
two Gore guideposts). 
 140. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428 (questioning the relevancy and utility of the third Gore 
guidepost in calculating punitive damages); see also Murphy, supra note 138, at 1444, 1461, 
1464 (finding that many post-Campbell courts disregard the third guidepost and do not consider it 
a dispositive cap on punitive damages); Solange E. Ritchie, The World After State Farm v. 
Campbell; Punitive Damages: Past, Present and Future, 33 W. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 99–100  
(2005-2006) (interpreting Campbell to consider the use of comparable criminal sanctions in 
determining reprehensibility—the first Gore guidepost). 
 141. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428 (discussing the trial court’s analysis of possible criminal 
penalties to calculate punitive awards). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Robert Force et al., Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages, Civil 
Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL. L. REV. 889, 957–60 (2011) (noting 
that the penalty amount depends on whether the violation is found to be neglectful or knowing 
and whether the incident is the perpetrator’s first or second violation). 
 144. Id. at 906–09.  As of Spring 2012, “the federal government [had] proposed fines of 
$45.7 million on BP, Transocean, and Halliburton for unsafe oil drilling practices.”  Koenig  
& Rustad, supra note 96, at 300. 
 145. Krauss, supra note 127, at B8. 
 146. Pierre Bertrand, BP Settles Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Lawsuit for $7.8 Billion, 
Additional Fines Possible, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2012, 3:23 PM), 
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also be relevant that the Obama Administration reached an agreement with BP 
under which the corporation established a $20 billion fund, administered by 
former 9/11 fund administrator Ken Feinberg, to compensate firms and 
individuals in the Gulf area who suffered damages from the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster.147  Therefore, because of the well-established practice that 
the third guidepost does not override liability under the other two guideposts, 
but serves primarily as an independent benchmark for courts to consider in 
evaluating the award, the prospect of potentially high civil and criminal 
penalties appears to support a large punitive damages award, better suited to 
the Deepwater Horizon incident than to run-of-the-mill industrial mishaps.  
Also pointing toward large punitive damages is the tendency of courts to look 
to intra- and inter-jurisdictional precedent to determine the excessiveness of a 
particular punitive damages award.148  For example, Exxon, where the oil 
company paid roughly $1.3 billion in civil and criminal penalties,149 also 
supports a very high punitive damages award. 
III.  “MARCHING ORDERS” VERSUS AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE DISCRETION: 
LOWER COURTS’ RESPONSIBILITY TO HIGHER COURT DIRECTIONS ON REMAND 
Rich literature exists on the issue of the discretion available to lower courts 
in handling cases returned to them on remand from higher courts.150  Similarly, 
many of these scholarly writings specifically address the responsibilities of 
lower courts when cases are remanded for reconsideration in light of changes 
in the governing law.151  However, important to this Article is the state courts’ 
handling on remand of a federally imposed constitutional analysis, which 
involves the realm of traditional federalism sensitivities.  When the Supreme 
Court grants certiorari to a state case, this often initiates the Court’s Grant, 
Vacate, and Remand (GVR) process—certiorari is granted, the lower court 
decision is vacated, and the case is remanded to the state court for further 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.ibtimes.com/bp-settles-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-lawsuit-78-billion-additional-fines 
-possible-419904. 
 147. Stephen Gidiere et al., The Coming Wave of Gulf Coast Oil Spill Litigation, 71 ALA. 
LAW. 374, 374 (2010). 
 148. See, e.g., Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, 801 A.2d 1158, 1169–70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2002). 
 149. Moreland, supra note 126, at 119. 
 150. See, e.g., Michael A. Berch, We’ve Only Just Begun: The Impact of Remand Orders 
from Higher to Lower Courts on American Jurisprudence, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 493, 493 (2004); 
Erwin Chemerinsky & Ned Miltenberg, The Need to Clarify the Meaning of U.S. Supreme Court 
Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages’ Cases, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 513–15 (2004). 
 151. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court’s Controversial GBRs—And an 
Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 711, 712 (2009); Sena Ku, The Supreme Court’s GVR Power: 
Drawing a Line Between Deference and Control, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 383–85 (2008); Shaun 
P. Martin, Gaming the GVR, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 551–53 (2004). 
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proceedings as directed by the Court.152  Supremacy concerns are periodically 
raised as to whether the state court, on remand, followed the Supreme Court’s 
instructions.153 
Remands from appellate courts for further proceedings below do not usually 
pose problems within state judicial systems or within the federal courts.  
Through their supervision powers, state supreme courts have the inherent 
capacity for dealing directly with non-responsive lower courts.154  The same 
holds true of higher federal courts and remands to lower federal courts.  
Remands within the federal system where jurisdiction is based on diversity of 
citizenship appear to cause few problems for state law development because 
state courts are not bound by the federal courts’ decisions as precedent.155  It is 
only the special case of challenged state supreme court decisions to which the 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari, issued a ruling, and remanded the case 
back to the state court for further proceedings that raises concerns about the 
state courts’ response to federal constitutional law dictates.156 
Scholarship devoted to this issue appears in periodic clusters in response to 
particularly vexing supremacy issues.  For example, one of the most sustained 
flurries is found in response to Brown v. Board of Education and focuses on 
the Supreme Court’s “with all deliberate speed”157 order.158  Other clusters can 
be found in response to decisions regarding certain civil rights issues,159 death 
penalty remands,160 sentencing guidelines,161 and, recently, punitive damages 
                                                      
 152. See Martin, supra note 151, at 551–62 (providing a discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
GVR process). 
 153. See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 154. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 140(b) (stating, “[t]he Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction . . . to issue such remedial writs or orders as may be necessary to give it 
general supervision and control of courts of inferior jurisdiction”); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 4 
(declaring, “[t]he Supreme Court shall have general superintending control over all courts; power 
to use, hear, and determining prerogative and remedial writs; and appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by rule of the Supreme Court”); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (maintaining, “[t]he 
Supreme Court shall have . . . appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings [except civil 
actions for less than $200]”). 
 155. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938). 
 156. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 157. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 158. See, e.g., Berch, supra note 150, at 495–96; Jim Chen, With All Deliberate Speed: 
Brown II and Desegregation’s Children, 24 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3–4 (2006); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies 
and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 609–12 (1983); Robert B. McKay, “With All Deliberate 
Speed”: A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1956); James. E. Pfander, 
Brown II: Ordinary Remedies for Extraordinary Wrongs, 24 LAW & INEQ. 47, 47–55 (2006). 
 159. Most mandated busing to facilitate school desegregation. 
 160. See, e.g., Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: 
Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423 (1994); Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, 
Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court’s Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 
811 (1983); Elise Borochoff, Comment, Lower Court Compliance with Supreme Court Remands, 
24 TOURO L. REV. 849, 852–54 (2008). 
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awards.162  In Campbell, the Utah Supreme Court provided some insight as to 
how to interpret a remand from the Supreme Court.163  Justice Kennedy, 
writing the majority opinion, opined that the “facts of this case . . . likely 
would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of the 
compensatory damages.”164  On remand, State Farm argued that this language 
strictly mandated the Utah Supreme Court to reduce the punitive damages 
award to an amount equal to the compensatory damages.165  After 
acknowledging its responsibility as an inferior court to honor the Supreme 
Court’s decisions with utmost fidelity, the Utah Supreme Court expressed 
skepticism that its duties could “be reduced to an enumerated task list imposed 
by a ‘mandate rule.’”166  The Utah Supreme Court explained that, if the federal 
court had chosen to fix the maximum size of the punitive damages award, the 
state court would have no choice but to order the reduction pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling.167  As read by the Utah Supreme Court, the Campbell 
opinion imposed no such mandate.168  Instead, the Utah Supreme Court 
reasoned that the Supreme Court was following its customary practice and 
entrusted the state court to calculate the precise punitive damages award that 
met both the legitimate objectives of the state and due process demands.169  
The Utah Supreme Court believed that, upon remand, the Supreme Court 
intended to vest in the state courts the discretion to determine reasonable and 
proportionate punitive damages awards.170  Applying the three guideposts and 
expressly disagreeing with Justice Kennedy’s opinion on several key points, 
including the appropriateness of a one-to-one ratio, the Utah Supreme Court 
settled on a punitive damages award of over $9 million—greater than nine 
times the compensatory damages.171 
A similar issue arose upon remand to the Alabama Supreme Court in Gore, 
in which the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that it 
was compelled to limit the punitive damages award to a ratio of less than four 
                                                                                                                             
 161. Tracy Friddle & Jon M. Sands, “Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right”: Remands, Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, & The Protect Act—A Radical “Departure”?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527,  
527–28 (2004). 
 162. Chemerinsky & Miltenberg, supra note 150, at 514–15; Goldman & Levin, supra note 
64, at 509–11; Douglas G. Harkin, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: A Trial Judge’s Guide 
to Jury Instructions and Judicial Review of Punitive Damage Awards, 60 MONT. L. REV. 367, 
367–70 (1999); Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court that 
Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 461–64 (2005). 
 163. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 411–12 (Utah 2004). 
 164. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003). 
 165. Campbell, 98 P.3d at 411. 
 166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 412. 
 171. Id. at 420. 
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times the compensatory damages.172  The Alabama Supreme Court ignored 
Justice Stevens’ suggestion that a four-to-one ratio was most appropriate and 
decided on a final punitive damages award of $50,000—twelve and one half 
times the $4,000 compensatory damages award.173 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to summarize the literature on this 
issue, but two themes commonly appear that are worth emphasizing.  First, in 
characterizing the behavior of lower courts on remand, as illustrated in 
Campbell, much depends on the explicitness of the orders or the precision of 
the instructions handed down by the higher court.174  Second, in the absence of 
specific orders or precise instructions, a well-developed jurisprudence on 
punitive damages awards has simply not emerged to guide lower courts 
handling cases on remand.  Scholars remark that the law in this area is “fluid” 
and lacks guiding “neutral principles.”175  The few studies available on this 
issue suggest a low incidence of lower courts scrupulously fulfilling the 
decisional expectations of remanding courts.176  This study of recent punitive 
damages decisions provides new insights into the lowers courts’ fealty to what 
may or may not be perceived by them as “marching orders” issued by higher 
courts. 
The “remittitur” is a procedural option not available in all jurisdictions.177  
Remittiturs strongly influence the rate at which disputed cases are remanded.178  
In jurisdictions where remittiturs are customary, a reviewing court may adjust 
punitive damages awards deemed unconstitutionally excessive and offer the 
plaintiff the opportunity to accept a reduced award by remitting damages above 
that level, or face a new trial on remand.179  Most plaintiffs choose to accept 
the reduced award, thereby ending the litigation.  Issues concerning whether or 
not a lower court has properly performed its duties on remand mostly arise in 
jurisdictions where remittitur is unavailable. 
IV.  THE STUDY AND ITS METHODOLOGY 
In order to see whether the Justices’ concerns in Williams III were valid 
regarding the lower court’s faithfulness to the Supreme Court’s punitive 
damages jurisprudence, this Article examines the reported punitive damages 
                                                      
 172. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997) (per curiam). 
 173. Id.  
 174. Borochoff, supra note 160, at 879. 
 175. Berch, supra note 150, at 508–09. 
 176. See, e.g., id. at 507–08. 
 177. Irene Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An Evaluation 
with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. L. REV.157, 163–69 (1987-1988). 
 178. Brad Snyder, Protecting the Media from Excessive Damages: The Nineteenth-Century 
Origins of Remittitur and Its Modern Application in Food Lion, 24 VT. L. REV. 299, 300 (2000). 
 179. Irene Sann, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 299 
(1976); see also Carlton Energy Grp., LLC v. Phillips, 369 S.W.3d 433, 441 (Tex. App. 2012) 
(explaining the plaintiff’s decision to accept remittitur in lieu of a new trial). 
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cases decided by lower state and federal courts since the 2003 Campbell 
decision.180  The over 500 collected opinions were classified by the type of 
plaintiff’s claim, which varied greatly from the type of economic harm at the 
center of Gore and Campbell.  The cases were classified into twelve different 
types of claims based on the criterion that at least ten cases involving the 
specific type of claim were required to justify a separate category.181  A 
substantial number of cases did not meet the ten-case criterion and were 
designated as “Other Cases.”  The wide variety in the types of punitive 
damages claims that fell into the “Other Cases” category accounted for nearly 
ten percent of the cases reviewed.182  Surprisingly, there were only a small 
handful of class action cases. 
Each case was analyzed in view of the type of claim presented, the 
implementation of each of the three guideposts, and the final outcome of the 
case.  Variations in the application of the guideposts were identified with 
particular attention given to the relationship between the compensatory 
damages and the punitive damages awarded.  The cases were tracked through 
several stages of appeals with attention given to the outcome and rationale at 
each stage of the process. 
The analysis examined how the guideposts were implemented by each court 
and noted difficulties experienced by courts in applying each of the relevant 
guideposts to the broad range of punitive damages claims in the study.  
Statements by a lower court suggesting resistance to the guideposts were 
specially noted.  Resistance or hostility to applying the guideposts was found 
to be rare; statements of frustration with the guideposts or signs of grudging 
acceptance of the Supreme Court’s directions were also collected.  This study 
yielded a broad idea of how the new constitutional punitive damages regime 
was implemented by lower courts, particularly noting signs of a lack of 
faithfulness or reluctance to implement the due process guideposts.183 
                                                      
 180. See generally Williams III Transcript, supra note 4.  For a list of cases included in the 
study, categorized by type of claim, see infra Appendix A.  
 181. The twelve claim types developed were: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) employment; 
(3) fraud; (4) creditor abuse; (5) business torts; (6) insurance; (7) wrongful death and personal 
injury; (8) privacy invasion; (9) product liability; (10) property damage; (11) civil rights 
violations, other than Title VII; and (12) Title VII violations.  See infra Appendix A.   
 182. Examples of punitive claims included in “Other Cases” were trespass to private 
property, securities fraud, aggravated assault and battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution.  
See generally infra Appendix A. 
 183. The review also looked beyond the “faithfulness” question to other problems that 
presented themselves in the lower courts’ implementation of the guideposts, including difficulties 
the lower courts were experiencing in performing their new responsibilities, specific issues for 
which the guideposts were not working well, and where further refinement of the guideposts by 
the Supreme Court or legislation could be beneficial.  The results of this analysis are forthcoming 
in a more comprehensive article. 
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A.  General Observations: Searching for Lack of Faithfulness 
The study revealed that the type of modern cases awarding punitive damages 
were much more varied than the two original cases yielding the guidepost 
analysis.  Consequently, the study required close scrutiny to determine whether 
the “faithfulness” concern manifested itself in particular categories of cases.  
The cases in which courts expressed any negative feelings toward the new 
punitive damages jurisprudence were so rare that no discernible trend could be 
identified with respect to specific types of cases. 
The study also revealed a trend that most state courts treated the new 
constitutional jurisprudence as supplemental to, and not a replacement for, 
their existing state law governing punitive damages.184  For example, if state 
law had developed its own multi-part test for determining the appropriateness 
of punitive damages in a particular case, as most states had, later state court 
opinions simply adjusted these existing standards to include the three Supreme 
Court guideposts, or they applied the guideposts as a second level of review.185 
A significant number of cases involving punitive damages were brought in 
federal courts by plaintiffs who invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction.  The 
federal court decisions based on diversity appeared to discover and apply the 
relevant state law on punitive damages, while carefully enforcing the evolving 
constitutional jurisprudence.186 
B.  Overall Trends Show that Lower Courts Follow the Supreme Court’s 
“Marching Orders” 
To the extent that general trends could be observed over the ten years of 
cases studied, most noticeable was that, as a body of local law developed, state 
or federal courts within the jurisdiction applying the guideposts increasingly 
referred to precedents established by earlier decisions, particularly in the 
application of the third guidepost. 
Based on the strong concerns expressed by several Supreme Court Justices 
in oral argument during Williams III,187 one might expect, in a study of over 
500 lower court opinions, to find considerable evidence of resistance or 
reluctance to carry out the new constitutional “marching orders.”  Instead, the 
study found that the lower courts almost always invoked the new constitutional 
doctrine correctly and dutifully proceeded to analyze the reasonableness and 
size of the punitive damages award before them by applying the three 
guideposts.188  Except for the three leading cases—Gore, Campbell, and 
Williams II, where, on remand, the state supreme courts parted company with 
                                                      
 184. See, e.g., James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 638 S.E.2d 667, 670–71 (S.C. 2006) (agreeing 
with the lower courts’ additional use of the Gamble test). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See generally infra Appendix A. 
 187. Williams III Transcript, supra note 4, at 42, 48. 
 188. See generally infra Appendix A. 
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some aspect of the Supreme Court’s analysis,189—the strongest negativity 
found in ten years of lower court opinions arose because of growing 
dissatisfaction with Guidepost 3.  Many courts noted the absence of a relevant 
civil fine or other penalty for similar misconduct to use as a reference point for 
the size of the punitive damages award being reviewed.190  A number of courts 
questioned whether possible criminal sentences or administrative sanctions are 
even relevant to the comparability analysis,191 and others simply skipped or 
substantially downplayed Guidepost 3 in their due process analysis.192  
Increasingly, lower courts appear to be converting Guidepost 3 into a search 
for comparable litigation results in punitive damages cases in their own 
jurisdiction.193  Some courts looked for decisions applying Guidepost 3 in 
other jurisdictions that were relevant to the “fair notice” origins of this 
substantive-due-process based review.194 
The Montana Supreme Court’s analysis in Seltzer v. Morton195 exemplifies 
the typical perspective of state courts considering a more general application of 
the guideposts.  In attempting to apply the guideposts to the facts of the 
malicious prosecution case before them, the Montana Supreme Court first 
stated, “we have come to appreciate the dissenting statements [in Gore and 
Campbell] regarding the vague nature of the Gore guideposts,”196 but 
continued on to hold: “Of course, we are nonetheless bound to follow federal 
precedent here, and we have endeavored to do so meticulously.”197  The New 
Mexico Court of Appeals penned similar reservations, saying that “[w]eighing 
the guidepost factors as we must with their built-in imprecision and 
indeterminateness, . . . we are unable to conclude that the punitive damages 
award was excessive or was the result of passion and prejudice.”198  This 
outlook is hardly an indication of a judicial rebellion. 
Similarly, the California Court of Appeals commented that “determination 
of the maximum constitutional amount of punitive damages is not easy or 
                                                      
 189. See supra notes 8, 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 190. See, e.g., Mendez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 112 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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 195. 154 P.3d 561, 600 n.19 (Mont. 2007). 
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exact” and that an appellate court, therefore, “must rely on [the panel’s] 
combined experience and judgment.”199  Several other courts have observed 
that this new regime of federal constitutional law is something for which the 
Supreme Court has “mandated . . . ‘exacting’ de novo review,”200 and that 
“[a]lthough . . . the punitive damages award was reasonable under [state law], 
we must also review . . . under Gore.”201  Although these courts may be 
expressing a modicum of unhappiness at having to undertake the extra level of 
constitutional review, even this hint of reluctance is infrequent. 
In recent state court decisions, the type of frustration with implementing the 
guideposts that Judge W. Michael Gillette of the Oregon Supreme Court 
expressed in his 2011 dissent is not common, but Judge Gillette may speak for 
a number of lower court judges: 
I add one final note: a plea to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  For years this court generally, and I personally, have 
struggled to apply Gore and Campbell faithfully to the cases before 
us.  This case represents but one of the many problems that have 
cropped up in the seven years since the Court decided Campbell.  
The courts around are in need of—indeed, I will assert that we  
deserve—further guidance that only the Court can provide.  Whether 
the Court agrees with my analysis, or the majority, or something in 
between, does not matter to me.  But it would be a responsible act of 
comity for the Court to say something clear to help in future cases.202 
V.  RECONCILING FAITHFULNESS FINDINGS WITH THE JUSTICES’ CONCERNS 
Finding almost universal faithfulness on the part of lower courts in accepting 
and applying the guideposts raises an interesting question: Given the 
seriousness of the concerns expressed by three justices in the Williams III oral 
arguments,203 why did the lower courts not express more reluctance to engage 
in this additional layer of federally mandated judicial review? 
One possible answer lies in the very limited nature of the issue under review 
in Williams III, which elicited the concerns in the first place.204  Unlike other 
punitive damages cases to reach the Supreme Court, the case involved the 
narrowest of issues—the questionable phrasing of a single jury instruction.205 
Even Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Williams II was somewhat unclear as 
to whether the issue was a procedural irregularity or an error of substantive 
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law.206  If the challenged instruction misstated the controlling constitutional 
law concerning how juries are to calculate punitive damages awards, it would 
conventionally require a substantive due process analysis.  Justice Breyer, 
however, characterized the problem as procedural.207  If the mistake was 
substantive, and Oregon subsequently acknowledged a correct understanding 
of the applicable constitutional law, as it did in subsequent cases,208 then this 
flurry of concerns about lower court fidelity to Supreme Court precedent was 
much ado about nothing. 
Conversely, if the error was strictly procedural and Oregon may 
constitutionally prescribe the method by which a defendant may preserve this 
type of objection to a jury instruction for appellate review, then the Oregon 
decision denying Philip Morris the opportunity for further review of the issue 
was legitimate in light of the Supreme Court’s deference to the states on such 
litigation decisions.209  If so, then perhaps the Justices’ reaction—interjecting 
themselves so memorably during oral arguments to express concerns about the 
Oregon court’s ruling, possibly encouraging noncompliance by other lower 
courts—was perhaps an exaggerated reaction in the heat of the moment and 
later regretted.210  Under either interpretation, the apparent conflict between the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s insistence on following its own procedural rules and 
the Supreme Court’s concern that its earlier ruling was not being followed 
appears to lack a viable predicate. 
The most likely explanation, however, is that the inference of possible 
widespread unfaithfulness drawn from the Justices’ expressions of concern in 
the Williams III oral arguments211 was nothing more than over-the-top 
speculation without solid information about what was actually happening in 
the great majority of lower courts.  Punitive damages cases reach the U.S. 
Supreme Court very infrequently, and it is even rarer that the Court finds a 
constitutional error and remands to the state courts for corrective action.212  
The dynamic of a state supreme court reacting to a remand from the Supreme 
Court to reapply the guideposts is quite different from the ordinary review of 
punitive damages awards in light of the guideposts within state or lower 
federal court systems.  With the benefit of hindsight, projecting a 
“faithfulness” problem from the Oregon Supreme Court’s reaction to the 
                                                      
 206. Id. at 349–58. 
 207. Id. at 353. 
 208. See Schwartz v. Philip Morris Inc., 235 P.3d 668, 678 (Or. 2010) (approving the 
corrected jury instructions). 
 209. Sharkey, supra note 25, at 449. 
 210. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 211. Williams III Transcript, supra note 4, at 46, 48. 
 212. Gash, supra note 32, at 527 (stating, “the Court is almost certainly entering an extended 
silent phase in its punitive damages jurisprudence and will not be reviewing any punitive 
damages awards for the foreseeable future”). 
404 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 62:371 
remand in Williams II213 was probably unjustified, and the study confirms this 
conclusion. 
Interestingly, in nearly every opinion that the Supreme Court has issued 
involving this new substantive due process analysis to detect excessive 
punitive damages awards, the Court has made a point of acknowledging that, 
under well-established principles of federalism within the broad constitutional 
boundaries laid out in Gore214 and Campbell,215 it is the state’s primary 
responsibility to make the ultimate decision regarding the best way to protect 
the state’s interest through the awarding of punitive damages to produce 
retribution and deterrence of wrongful conduct.  Thus, the constitutional 
doctrine that underlies these interactions between the Supreme Court and state 
supreme courts contemplates granting a great deal of independence and 
discretion to the state courts in determining the need for punitive damages and 
fixing the appropriate size of the award in a particular case.  This federalism 
dynamic is less prevalent in higher state courts that review lower state courts’ 
punitive damages awards, or federal courts of appeal reviewing district courts’ 
diversity actions for punitive damages awards, thereby further diminishing the 
likelihood of “unfaithfulness.” 
Another possible answer to the absence of support for the “unfaithfulness” 
hypothesis in the lower court decisions lies in the ready availability of the 
remittitur device in most jurisdictions.  When the reviewing court has the 
option of offering the winning defendant a remitter of the excessive punitive 
damages award or a new trial, there are fewer remands to the lower courts, and, 
therefore, fewer occasions for the court to whom the remand is addressed to 
disagree with the remanding court or complain about reapplying the guideposts 
as directed by the superior court. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
However its near total absence is explained, the “unfaithfulness” concern 
raised in the oral arguments in Williams III simply cannot be substantiated as a 
significant factor in the over 500 punitive damages cases studied.  To the 
contrary, except in the handful of high profile Supreme Court cases in which 
inconsistency can be clearly observed between the Supreme Court’s “marching 
orders” in the remand and the state court’s subsequent disposition of the case, 
there is virtually no evidence of a lack of fidelity by lower courts to the 
constitutional guideposts governing review of punitive damages awards.  
Further, beyond widespread frustration with Guidepost 3, there are almost no 
signs of resistance or reluctance to applying the guideposts as promulgated by 
the Supreme Court.216  Lower state and federal courts appear to be making 
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2013] Implementing the Evolving Due Process Guideposts 405 
  
conscientious efforts to honor the guideposts, interpret them reasonably, and 
apply them in the spirit in which they were promulgated. 
It is certainly true, however, that not all lower courts are consistent in the 
way they interpret and apply the guideposts, but the differences are not based 
on resistance to the obligation to carry out their constitutional duties.217  
Rather, lower courts reach different results in similar cases after carefully 
parsing the holdings and dicta found in the key Supreme Court opinions to find 
respectable rationales for decision, based on the peculiar facts of a case.  This 
remains consistent with the Supreme Court’s expectations and is readily 
observable across the full spectrum of judicial decisions at both the state and 
federal levels.218 
This is not to deny that there exist a number of perplexing problems that 
bubble to the surface when lower courts attempt to apply the guideposts in the 
manner they think the Supreme Court expects.  These are the issues that will 
form the core of the second phase of this research project in which the same 
ten years of cases will be analyzed to determine how well the guideposts are 
working in practice to achieve the purposes for which the Supreme Court 
created them.  To the extent certain aspects of the guideposts appear to be 
causing lower courts problems, analysis will be applied to offer suggestions 
about how the guideposts might be improved to make them more effective 
tools for correcting excessiveness in punitive damages awards.  This larger and 
more important project will be reported in a forthcoming article co-authored 
with Professor Laura J. Hines of the University of Kansas School of Law. 
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